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Food Fraud Vulnerability assessment: reliable data sources and effective assessment 1 
approaches 2 
 3 
Abstract 4 
Background: Multiple food fraud vulnerability assessment (FFVA) tools have been developed 5 
and refined to capture and quantify food fraud issues in the supply chain.  6 
 7 
Scope and approach: The aim of this research is to review existing FFVA tools and the 8 
databases that underpin them and consider the challenges, limitations and opportunities in 9 
their use. The databases considered include: the Rapid Alert for Food and Feed Safety 10 
(RASFF) database, the Food Fraud Risk Information, Decernis Food Fraud Database, 11 
FoodSHIELD, and HorizonScan. Four FFVA tools, Safe Supply of Affordable Food 12 
Everywhere (SSAFE), the two Food Fraud Advisor’s vulnerability assessment tools and 13 
EMAlert, are also critiqued in this paper from the viewpoint of the tools available and their 14 
efficacy for food fraud vulnerability assessment. 15 
 16 
Key findings and conclusion: There is a clear requirement for more industry level 17 
cohesiveness and consistency in how FFVA is undertaken to address both intrinsic and 18 
extrinsic food fraud vulnerability.  FFVA tools differ from conventional purely food safety 19 
hazard analysis or risk assessment tools as FFVA also requires consideration of socio-20 
economic factors, knowledge levels of organization, and understanding of criminal behavior. 21 
The challenge therefore is to develop FFVA tools further so that they support assessment of 22 
existing vulnerabilities and overcome knowledge gaps to then assist food supply chain 23 
professionals in understanding where and how fraud might occur, and the situational 24 
vulnerabilities for a given organisation or food supply chain so this intelligence will effectively 25 
inform the appropriate options for food fraud control and mitigation.  26 
 27 
Keywords: food fraud, vulnerability, intentional, adulteration, database  28 
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  29 
Highlights 30 
 Vulnerability has multiple attributes that need to be considered in a risk assessment. 31 
 Multiple data source exist their use is limited by subscription only access. 32 
 Behavioural assessment is a key aspect of FFVA tools 33 
 34 
  35 
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1. Introduction 36 
   Food fraud involves intentional modification of food products and/or associated 37 
documentation for economic gain and may lead to issues of food safety, legality and/or quality 38 
depending on the activities undertaken or the agent(s) used. Food manufacturers, as part of 39 
the assessment of their vulnerability to food fraud need to identify the individual food materials 40 
and products that they procure, supply and/or produce that have a history of illicit activity. 41 
Supply chains are complex networks that are shaped by the inter-relationships between 42 
actors, the processes undertaken and the inputs and outputs associated with those processes 43 
(Wang, van Fleet & Mishral, 2017).  Due to the high incidence of reported problems in the 44 
past, certain food types, geographic sources and associated supply chains are seen as having 45 
historically higher levels of concern with regard to food fraud. For a given supplier organisation, 46 
service or ingredient, historic levels of compliance can be used to determine foods or 47 
ingredients that are vulnerable to food fraud.  These foods include fish, meat, cereals, milk, 48 
olive oil, organic product and spices (Xiu & Klein, 2010; Silvis, van Ruth, van der Fels-Klerx & 49 
Luning, 2017; van Ruth, Huisman & Luning, 2017). Food fraud is an overarching term and the 50 
sub-types of food fraud determined in the literature and emergent standards are outlined in 51 
Table 1. 52 
Take in Table 1 53 
For perpetrators, successful modes of food fraud are measured in terms of the degree of 54 
financial gain when compared with the risk of detection (Manning & Soon, 2014). As 55 
opportunities arise, and the risk of detection decreases, the effort required to commit crime for 56 
the benefit derived is reduced. In contrast, the higher the probability of being detected or 57 
caught, the lower the returns for the fraudster (Spink & Moyer, 2011a). From an anti-fraud 58 
perspective, it is difficult to predict where fraud may occur as fraudsters, if their modus 59 
operandi is to remain undiscovered, are constantly required to identify new opportunities and 60 
channels for committing fraud (Kingston, 2017). The key to preventing food fraud is the 61 
development of measures to assess, detect, mitigate and where possible prevent it from 62 
occurring. However, Everstine, Spink & Kennedy (2013) assert that economically motivated 63 
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adulteration (EMA)  differs from other food threats as it is not readily predicted through food 64 
safety risk assessments and intervention strategies. Instead food fraud vulnerability 65 
assessment (FFVA) systematically considers the factors that create vulnerabilities in a supply 66 
chain, i.e. where food fraud is more likely to occur (Nestle, n.d.). 67 
The Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI, 2018) defines a food fraud vulnerability as “the 68 
susceptibility or exposure to a food fraud risk, which is regarded as a gap or deficiency that 69 
could place consumer health at risk if not addressed”. It is important to differentiate between 70 
intrinsic vulnerabilities i.e. those vulnerabilities that occur within the business at the micro 71 
(individual) and meso (organisational level) and extrinsic vulnerabilities that occur at the 72 
macro level in the external environment, and as a result are more difficult for the business to 73 
control. GFSI (2018) distinguishes between a hazard, (something with the a potential to cause 74 
harm), and risk (the probability of loss or injury from a hazard), stating that susceptibility to a 75 
[given] risk is not only linked to the severity of the risk, but also to the company’s awareness 76 
of their weakness and also how they manage it.  This concept provides a distinct approach to 77 
considering vulnerability, and underpins the rational for this paper. In this context, the aim of 78 
this review is to provide context through comparing and contrasting risk assessment and 79 
vulnerability assessment and then analysing existing FFVA tools and the databases that 80 
underpin them. This approach allows assessment of the consistency of how food fraud 81 
vulnerability is determined by different models. 82 
 83 
2. Risk assessment versus vulnerability assessment 84 
2.1 Risk assessment 85 
Risk assessment is the overall process of risk identification, risk analysis and risk 86 
evaluation. International Standardisation Organisation (ISO) Guide 73 (2009) states risk 87 
assessment (finding, recognising and describing risk) leads into risk analysis, (the process 88 
to understand the risk and determine its likelihood), and risk evaluation.  The Guide highlights 89 
that risk evaluation is the process of comparing the results of risk analysis with risk criteria to 90 
determine firstly the significance of the risk and whether that degree of risk is acceptable i.e. 91 
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it is a risk identification and quantification process. This approach is thus a separate activity 92 
from risk management. Risk management is situated to an organisation’s activities and drives 93 
an approach that leads to continuous improvement in seeking to eliminate or reduce risk. Risk 94 
management is integrated into all organisational activities; involves a structured and 95 
comprehensive focus that is dynamic and reflects internal and external risk factors; is inclusive 96 
and ensures appropriate and timely involvement of necessary stakeholders and considers the 97 
degree of uncertainty in the data available; and uses a holistic approach that considers the 98 
social (human and cultural) factors that influence risk (ISO 31000, 2018).   99 
Zio (2016, p141) highlights the dangers of reducing risk assessment to a given number or 100 
value because “the values of probability in two different situations could be the same, but their 101 
assignment may be based on quite different knowledge, data and information, and eventually 102 
assumptions [or degrees of uncertainty], which leave quite different room for surprises of 103 
unforeseen events and related consequences.” These concerns have particular emphasis 104 
when considering food fraud risk assessment to then inform risk management systems. 105 
Indeed Manning (2019) argues that predictive risk assessment tools such as hazard analysis 106 
critical control point (HACCP), threat analysis critical control point (TACCP), and vulnerability 107 
analysis critical control point, (VACCP) have limited value in terms of unknown or 108 
unquantifiable food crime threats creating the potential for supply chain vulnerabilities to be 109 
both unknowable and unrecognised. 110 
The PAS 96 (2017) Guide highlights the process of undertaking risk assessment for food 111 
crime including food fraud throughout a food business. The risk assessment process requires 112 
the semi-quantitative determination of likelihood and impact, deriving a risk score and then 113 
prioritising a risk management process to reduce risk. The process is supported by a risk 114 
matrix leading to the development of a threat identification matrix that at each process step 115 
identifies threats, vulnerabilities, access, mitigation, and testing programmes. TACCP is thus 116 
a risk assessment and a risk management methodology that uses a risk matrix to prioritise 117 
internal and external risk associated with fraud in order to prioritise the allocation of resources 118 
and the weighting can be arbitary.   119 
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 120 
 2.2 Vulnerability assessment 121 
Vulnerability is a measure of a system’s susceptibility, or conversely resilience, to threat 122 
scenarios whereas the level of risk focuses on the consequences and their severity should a 123 
threat be realised (Ezell, 2007).  Zio (2016) suggests there are multiple perceptions of 124 
vulnerability and this will ultimately affect how individuals or teams assess vulnerability. 125 
Vulnerability can be considered as a product, technical or system attribute namely: 126 
a. The extent to which vulnerability is a weakness or flaw i.e. vulnerability as a “gap or an 127 
element of the system that is missing”. An organisation can apply vulnerability 128 
assessment internally or externally to a whole supply chain in order to identify the weak 129 
areas or hotspots that are vulnerable to food fraud. An internal vulnerability 130 
assessment aids understanding of the weaknesses, criticalities and access points 131 
within a specific manufacturing environment where there are food fraud vulnerabilities;  132 
b. By seeing vulnerability as a risk i.e. the degree of exposure (likelihood x severity) 133 
through the use of tools such as HACCP, TACCP or VACCP;  134 
c. Through considering vulnerability in terms of the consequences i.e. the degree of loss 135 
or damages;  136 
 137 
d. By assessing vulnerability in terms of it reducing the capacity of an organisation or 138 
supply chain  to return to a steady state i.e. determining vulnerability  in terms of ability 139 
to return to the status quo; or 140 
e. As failure to be resilient where resilience is seen as continuous improvement into the 141 
long term i.e. determining vulnerability as a failure to be sustainable.  142 
f.  143 
As previously explored in this paper, vulnerability can also be assessed at the micro, meso 144 
and macro level of a food system with the resultant challenge that vulnerability assessment 145 
requires systems rather than linear (cause and effect) thinking. Vulnerability assessment, if 146 
undertaken appropriately, can define the actions required to eliminate weak points, or 147 
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vulnerability points, and reduce the potential for food fraud to a level the organisation deems 148 
acceptable. The GFSI Position Statement on Mitigating the Public Health Risk of Food Fraud 149 
(GFSI, 2014) defines FFVA as a two-stage approach. Firstly,  “ information is collected at the 150 
appropriate points along the supply chain (including raw materials, ingredients, products, 151 
packaging) and evaluated to identify and prioritise significant vulnerabilities for food fraud”  152 
and then secondly, appropriate control measures need to be in place to reduce the risk arising 153 
from these vulnerabilities. (GFSI, 2014). Thus, a relevant FFVA informs the development of a 154 
control plan. Four years later, the GFSI develop this rationale further into two elements a 155 
FFVA, and then a food fraud mitigation plan (GFSI, 2018). Therefore, vulnerability assessment 156 
considers the strength, or weakness, of an organisation’s food fraud mitigation strategy (Cavin, 157 
Cottenet, Blancpain, Bessaire, Frank, & Zbinden, 2016).  158 
Marvin et al. (2016) drew together a set of variables that influence an organisation’s 159 
vulnerability to food fraud. These criteria including economic factors (e.g. price, supply and 160 
demand); national factors associated with the country of origin (e.g. governance) and 161 
specific incident related factors such as fraud type, complexity and the potential for fraud 162 
detection to then be able to identify headline predictors of food fraud. Price Waterhouse 163 
Cooper (PwC, 2016) differentiates between economic and market factors such as economic 164 
conditions, value attributes, financial strains, level of competition and associated strategies, 165 
and supply/demand and pricing and cultural and behavioral factors such as personal gain 166 
or desperation, corruption level, blackmail, victimisation and ethical business culture.  As well 167 
as the determination of what vulnerability is and how vulnerability is articulated within FFVA 168 
tools, the other factor that influences the effectiveness of these tools is the source, situational 169 
applicability, quality and validity of the data and then the type of methodological assessment 170 
approach in which the data is used. A typology of sampling has been synthesized in this 171 
research that is utilised within this paper to differentiate between data and information sources 172 
used for a given FFVA (Table 2). 173 
Take in Table 2 174 
8 
 
The type of sampling is important because it has an impact on how the dataset that is 175 
derived can be interpreted. The data can be influenced by whether its source is from regulatory 176 
sampling that is based on purposive, random, probability or suspect sampling (see Table 2). 177 
Further, the sampling method will influence the accuracy of assessment and also the level of 178 
confidence that can be attributed to the result. Further, differentiated categorisation of 179 
incidents in databases together with differences in the rationale for how the data is collected 180 
can reduce the opportunity for comparative analysis and influence the ability to compare or 181 
pool data from multiple datasets (Kowalska, Soon & Manning, 2018). This makes the 182 
assessment of food fraud vulnerability based on information held in databases an evolving art. 183 
 184 
3. Food information databases 185 
This section compares a series of databases that contain information that can be used 186 
by an organisation in assessing their internal or external vulnerability to food fraud. Five 187 
databases critiqued here are either open access platforms e.g. the European Union (EU) 188 
Rapid Alert for Food and Feed Safety Portal (RASFF) and others are commercial databases 189 
that require a subscription payment for access or have some free to access components and 190 
other pay to download elements.   191 
 192 
3.1 Rapid Alert for Food and Feed Safety (RASFF) Portal - Information Exchange 193 
Forum 194 
The RASFF provides an information exchange forum for member states and regulatory 195 
bodies to provide food and feed control authorities with information about the measures taken 196 
to respond to serious problems either detected in relation to food or feed being imported into 197 
the EU or being transferred within the EU (RASFF, 2017). These problems include food safety 198 
issues and instances of food fraud. The EU RASFF database is a centralised and searchable 199 
database where urgent notifications can be sent, received and responded to (RASFF, 2018). 200 
Members, including the European Commission, EU members, the European Food Safety 201 
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Authority (EFSA), the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Surveillance Authority, (i.e. 202 
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) and Switzerland (RASFF, 2018).  203 
The EU Administrative Assistance and Cooperation (AAC) system operates alongside 204 
the RASFF system with the aim of effective information sharing to ensure a swift reaction 205 
following detection of public health risks in the food chain and the EU Food Fraud 206 
Network (FFN) exchanges information within this system (EC, 2019a). However, data is not 207 
freely available except in the form of historic reports. The FFN was established to manage 208 
requests for cross-border cooperation and to ensure the rapid exchange of information 209 
between the Commission and national authorities in the event of suspected fraudulent 210 
practices (Bouzembrak et al. 2018). The use of the RASFF database, either solely or in 211 
conjunction with data from national databases has informed research into the types of 212 
incidents as well as the value of such databases in informing risk or vulnerability assessment 213 
(Tähkäpää, Maijala, Korkeala & Nevas, 2015; Bouzembrak & Marvin, 2016; Marvin et al. 214 
2016). However it should be noted that the data comes from a variety of sources and whilst 215 
some standardisation of food classifications has taken place these classifications do not 216 
replicate those in other databases which limits the drawing of inference from the pooling of 217 
information from multiple datasets 218 
The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA, nd) states: “A standardised system for 219 
classifying and describing food makes it easier to compare data from different sources and 220 
perform more detailed types of data analysis.” The system used by the EFSA for classification 221 
is FoodEx2. The EFSA uses RASFF data together with other data from competent authorities 222 
throughout the EU to inform the risk assessments undertaken. The EFSA also differentiate 223 
between databases in terms of the degree of openness of a dataset and define four maturity 224 
levels: 225 
 Beginners: in the early stages of transition to an open data policy;  226 
 Followers: with a basic open data policy and some advanced features on their 227 
portal, but there are limitations for the public use/reuse of datasets;  228 
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 Fast trackers: greater advancement in their open data journey than followers; and 229 
 Leaders: who have implemented an advanced open data policy with extensive portal 230 
features (Foster et al. 2019).  231 
These criteria will be used to determine the maturity of the databases considered in this paper 232 
in the critique in Table 3. 233 
Take in Table 3 234 
 235 
3.2 Food Fraud Risk Information Database 236 
Food Fraud Risk Information (https://trello.com/b/aoFO1UEf/food-fraud-risk-237 
information) is a free and accessible database on incidences of food fraud and emerging 238 
threats (Food Fraud Advisors, 2017; Food Fraud Risk Information, n.d.). The site is designed 239 
in an easy to navigate manner with highlights of the most recent food fraud incidences by 240 
month or by product category. The site allows users to view incidences according to food and 241 
drink categories including packaging materials and marketing claims. There is an internal risk 242 
rating (low through to high), but the criteria for how risk has been determined is not outlined. 243 
Individual incidents can be accessed for free but there is no free downloadable reporting 244 
function. A static off-line historic database can be downloaded as an Excel spreadsheet for a 245 
on-off fee.  The source of information is important here especially in terms of its validity and 246 
representativeness. Through exposing incidents, the media plays an increasingly important 247 
role in providing the evidence that underpins food fraud governance, influencing the behaviour 248 
and attitudes of government, food producers and consumers. However, Zhu, Huang and 249 
Manning (2019) highlight there is a difference between the number and type of incident being 250 
reported by government reports and those by the media as the media tends to report incidents 251 
that have a public interest element and outline more of a “story” associated with the problem 252 
(see also the work of Bouzembrak et al. 2018). In essence, developing databases through the 253 
use of media material as a source of evidence means that such databases are socially rather 254 
than an objectively constructed, thus the evidence is not independent of the social norms that 255 
frame it. 256 
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 257 
3.3 Decernis Food Fraud Database 258 
The former US Pharmacopoeia (USP) Food Fraud Mitigation Database has been 259 
renamed the Food Fraud Database and is owned by Decernis. The food fraud database 260 
contains information about more than 4000 ingredients with 9000 related records that arise 261 
from a variety of sampling activities and methods of data collection (Decernis, 2019). The 262 
global database is continuously updated with information from scientific articles, media, 263 
regulatory and judicial reports and food industry and trade associations. The database is not 264 
open access.  The database is developed with incident and inference reports, surveillance 265 
records, and analytical methods classified by ingredient (Decernis, 2019). The database 266 
allows searching and trend identification with weekly EMA incident reports. The incident 267 
reports are given a weighting factor based on the quality of source/evidence with high being 268 
allocated to scientific or legal sources and media sources being assigned either a medium or 269 
low weighting.  270 
This means that the weighting is based on an objective-subjective paradigm i.e. from 271 
objective scientific or legal data to subjective, often socially constructed reports. 272 
 273 
3.4 Food Adulteration Incidents Registry (FAIR) 274 
The US Food Protection and Defense Institute (FPDI), is located at the University of 275 
Minnesota. The FPDI’s Food Adulteration Incidents Registry (FAIR) is a database that 276 
compiles global data on both EMA and intentional adulteration of foods. It provides limited 277 
access to all users to search entries such as food category, date, adulterated food products, 278 
adulterants, method of adulteration and originated location (FAIR, 2019). However, access to 279 
recent incidents (within the 5 past years) requires the payment of a subscription. The database 280 
catalogues a wide range of EMA incidents and is searchable according to incident 281 
characteristics such as food adulterant, production location, data, morbidity or mortality data 282 
within a wider interaction of databases for food fraud and food defense. 283 
 284 
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3.5 Food Integrity Network (FIN) 285 
The Food Integrity (FI) Network (FIN, 2019) is a platform for stakeholders and experts to 286 
exchange knowledge and expertise in food authenticity, safety and quality; and to rapidly 287 
share information and intelligence about suspected and actual incidents to protect consumers 288 
and food products from damaging effects of food misdescription (Source: 289 
https://secure.fera.defra.gov.uk/foodintegrity/expertdb/index.cfm). HorizonScan is an 290 
associated global database that monitors commodity safety (more than 500 commodities), 291 
tracks over 22,000 suppliers and scans the  official sites of over 180 countries and more than 292 
100 independent sources daily. The database is searchable by commodity. It is a subscriber 293 
only service (FERA, 2019). Email alerts can be tailored to the commodities and issues 294 
important to the food business. 295 
 296 
3.6 European Commission’s Joint Research Centre Europe Media Monitor (EMM)  297 
System 298 
The EMM allows users to explore current news items reported by the world’s online 299 
media in 70 languages over 20000 RSS feeds and HTML pages sites from 7000 generic news 300 
portals and 20 commercial news wires (EMM, 2019). The Medical Information System or 301 
Medisys is a subset of this dataset that seeks to identify potential threats to public health e.g. 302 
communicable disease, terrorist attacks or chemical or nuclear accidents (EMM, 2019). 303 
Medisys (Source: http://medisys.newsbrief.eu/) continuously monitors about 900 specialist 304 
medical sites plus all the generic EMM news on the main site. The open access site but 305 
requires specific searching to access information on food fraud issues. The JRC provide a 306 
monthly news report which is freely available online about food fraud incidents. 307 
 Researchers have used the Medisys database in their research. An Early Warning 308 
System (EWS) was developed that can detect potential food fraud (Mojtahed, 2018). EWS 309 
harvests data from the EMM that analyses, curates and aggregates information from 310 
traditional and social media globally (EU Science Hub, 2017). The EWS has been further 311 
refined and developed into a food fraud tool (MedISys-FF) that collects, analyses and presents 312 
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food fraud reports published in worldwide media (Bouzembrak et al. 2018). The tool was 313 
benchmarked against RASFF, EMA (now FAIR) and HorizonScan and the MedISys-FF 314 
system collected food fraud information with high relevance (>75%).   315 
 316 
3.7 The US Food And Drug Administration (FDA) Recalls, Market Withdrawals 317 
and Safety Alerts Database 318 
The US FDA Recalls, Market Withdrawals and Safety Alerts Database is the US 319 
regulators database of recalls (older information is archived but available). The database is 320 
searchable and the data can be filtered using key words (see 321 
https://www.fda.gov/safety/recalls/). This database has a wider scope than food fraud as it 322 
includes all incidents that required a regulatory recall. 323 
 324 
3.8 UK Food Surveillance System (UKFSS) Database 325 
The UKFSS is a UK regulatory database that records the analytical and examination 326 
results for all food and feed samples, submitted for analysis and/or examination by official 327 
control laboratories on behalf of UK local authorities and port health authorities (Food 328 
Standards Agency (FSA), 2019). In Scotland, the food sampling data is held separately in the 329 
Scottish Food Sampling Database. This public analysis data is not available to the public as 330 
an open source. 331 
 332 
3.9 Private laboratory databases 333 
 Major private laboratories that provide analytical testing and services could contribute 334 
formally or informally to the creation, validation and sharing of the data. In the UK such 335 
organisations including Campden BRI. Campden BRI have also established with their food 336 
company members the Food Industry Intelligence Network (FIIN). The objectives of FIIN are:  337 
 To help ensure the integrity of food supply chains and protect the interests of the 338 
consumer; 339 
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 To address the recommendations from “The Elliott Report” (Elliott, 2014) for industry 340 
to establish a ‘safe haven’ to collect, collate, analyse and disseminate information and 341 
intelligence; 342 
 To share intelligence with governmental bodies to better understand where risks may 343 
sit in the UK Food Industry from food fraud, and 344 
 To help divert, detect, deter and disrupt those activities and in doing so, further 345 
enhance the reputation of the UK Food Industry (CBRI, 2019). 346 
Other private testing laboratories also hold data on food fraud incidents that may, or may 347 
not, be openly available. 348 
 349 
3.10 Summary 350 
 This section has highlighted the range of databases that can be used to identify historic levels 351 
of a particular kind of food fraud associated with a particular food, country or company. The 352 
databases are mostly subscribe to view which makes it difficult for small and medium sized 353 
companies (SMEs) to access this data in order to be better informed when undertaking FFVA. 354 
Spink, Moyer and Speier-Pero (2016) differentiate between four sources of data that ultimately 355 
inform FFVA for a given organisation: static external databases, dynamic external internet 356 
searches and automated keyword alerts (e.g. Google Alerts); internal datasets on known food 357 
fraud incidents within the organisation and lastly subject matter expert insight databases e.g. 358 
through groups such as FIIN.  Spink, Moyer and Speier-Pero (2016) also developed a four 359 
stage food fraud risk assessment. The first stage was a Food Fraud Initial Screening (FFIS) 360 
step as a precursor to a FFVA leading to a Corporate Risk Map and then a Resource Allocation 361 
Decision. The FFIS approach is divided into 4 steps:  362 
(i) define the assessment scope (e.g. specify supply chain and region) and qualitative 363 
risk ranking terminologies (e.g. very high / high / medium / low / very low);  364 
(ii) (ii) review incidents and suspicious activities (e.g. derived from internal sources, 365 
expert opinion or external databases);  366 
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(iii) (iii) screen for health hazards and enterprise risks (e.g. risk assess and rank health 367 
hazard and enterprise [financial] risks and post the screening phase, and then to  368 
(iv) (iv) plot the food fraud risks on a risk matrix.  369 
Once completed, the business can then prioritise risks and make informed decisions on the 370 
application of resources to mitigate the risk. Spink et al. (2016) conclude that the main 371 
advantage of FFIS is that the initial screening will allow for product groups with lower risks or 372 
with established controls to be removed from a following FFVA thus allowing subsequent 373 
vulnerability assessment to focus more specifically on higher risks. In order to undertake FFIS 374 
and the FFVA effectively, the assessment team needs to have access to appropriate data that 375 
can inform their decision-making. The tools that are available for FFVA are now considered. 376 
 377 
4.0 Food fraud vulnerability assessment (FFVA) tools 378 
  The development of FFVA tools and the extent of their usage is now critiqued.  The Wolfe 379 
and Hermanson (2004) seminal “fraud diamond” model proposes that four factors influence 380 
the potential for fraud: motivation, pressure, capability, and opportunity. Capability depends 381 
on the individual perpetrators and their ability to undertake fraudulent activities and opportunity 382 
to commit the activity, and also the degree of deterrence (Kowalska, Soon, & Manning, 2018). 383 
Pressure in this context can be considered to be regulatory or political pressure or alternatively 384 
supply chain pressure which can be influenced by market dynamics such as supply and 385 
demand gaps, cost pressures, and increasing pressure to meet supply chain standards. 386 
Motivation to commit fraud can be simply economic gain, other forms of self-interest or a wish 387 
to cause disruption or chaos. The FFVA concept by van Ruth, Huisman & Luning (2017) 388 
consists of three key elements and six groups of factors: two elements of the fraud diamond: 389 
opportunities (in time and place), motivations (economic drivers, culture and behaviour), and 390 
also vulnerability reduction in terms of implementing effective control measures (technical and 391 
managerial measures). The FFVA tool was developed and made available as a free 392 
downloadable app (van Ruth, Luning, Silvis, Yang, & Huisman, 2018). 393 
 394 
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4.1 Safe Supply of Affordable Food Everywhere (SSAFE) 395 
Safe Supply of Affordable Food Everywhere (SSAFE) is a not for profit organisation 396 
supported by a range of multi-national corporations that has developed a free, science-based 397 
online FFVA tool (Excel spreadsheet, online or a phone app) that could be used across the 398 
food supply chain (http://www.ssafe-food.org/our-projects/?proj=365#) (SSAFE, 2019). 399 
SSAFE developed the FFVA tool with Price Waterhouse Cooper (PwC), Wageningen 400 
University, VU University Amsterdam and following consultation with global food industry 401 
leaders (PwC, 2019). The use of this tool is advocated by the GFSI (2014). The advantage of 402 
the tool is its flexibility and applicability to different products, business size and region. Other 403 
key strengths associated with this tool is its versatility (available in 11 languages and maximise 404 
tool accessibility), and its online and offline usage capability. The tool is built upon the 405 
principles of HACCP as the FFVA also requires a team approach (e.g. security, finance, quality 406 
assurance). Users are guided by an initial decision tree analysis to determine the scope of 407 
assessment and then are taken through a series of questions (n=50). Each question contains 408 
3 fixed answers. This tool uses a systematic approach where users are provided with an 409 
explanation of why the question is important and each fixed answer contains information to 410 
assist users in selecting the most appropriate answer. Once completed, users will be able to 411 
assess the level of food fraud vulnerability and the means for its control (SSAFE, 2019). This 412 
tool is designed to be a practical vulnerability assessment tool suited to guiding manufacturers 413 
who may not have detailed and specific knowledge on food fraud and vulnerability. SSAFE 414 
can be used as both an intrinsic and extrinsic vulnerability assessment tool. Examples of 415 
intrinsic vulnerability assessed by SSAFE are internal processing activities, ethical business 416 
culture and business strategies. Extrinsic vulnerability can include the price of raw materials, 417 
corruption level of countries where suppliers are located and the level of competition across a 418 
selected food sector. The tool does not provide for developing specific mitigation techniques 419 
for a given vulnerability, but instead users can refer to information sources and references 420 
provided in the tool for further guidance.   421 
 422 
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4.2 Food Fraud Advisor’s Vulnerability Assessment Tool  423 
Food Fraud Advisors have designed two types of vulnerability assessment tool one being 424 
the generic FFVA (now version 3) and the other based on the method recommended by the 425 
British Retail Consortium (Food Fraud Advisors, 2018).  The tools are based on Excel 426 
spreadsheets that develop a vulnerability assessment for each raw material and ultimately a 427 
report that can be used for management and third party audits (see Table 4). The tool is not 428 
free a fee is payable for its use. 429 
Take in Table 4 430 
The FFVA BRC Method tool allows the user to assess their raw materials and ingredients 431 
only for vulnerability to EMA, substitution and dilution. A series of questions are used to assess 432 
the likelihood of occurrence (e.g. historic incidents, price fluctuations, complexity of supply 433 
chain) and likelihood of detection (e.g. direct sourcing, supply chain audits, routine testing) by 434 
answering simple yes / no questions. Answers and user’s comments are generated in the 435 
results page providing food businesses with the scope, vulnerability rating and description of 436 
the characteristics of the raw materials / ingredients. The extrinsic vulnerability rating is based 437 
on a semi-quantitative 5 x 5 matrix of likelihood of occurrence x likelihood of detection which 438 
generates three levels of risks (high, medium and low). The questions do address elements 439 
of the fraud diamond including pressure, capability and detection. 440 
The other conventional FFVA is designed to meet the requirements of GFSI food safety 441 
standards such as FSSC 22000 and has a wider scope in terms of the types of food fraud 442 
addressed (see Table 1) and the scope includes processing aids and packaging. There is also 443 
the option of the pre-screening method. This approach can then inform the controls required 444 
to reduce vulnerability. 445 
 446 
4.3 EMAlert – Economically Motivated Adulteration – Vulnerability Assessment Tool 447 
The Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA) and Battelle have worked in partnership to 448 
develop EMAlert, a software tool that enables food manufacturers to analyse and understand 449 
EMA vulnerabilities (EMAlert, 2019). This tool is different to the others in that it includes a 450 
18 
 
behavioural model to consider fraudster decision making and how this impacts on food fraud 451 
vulnerability. The tool is a pay for use subscription based system. The advantage of this 452 
system is that it can assess a greater number of commodities (50) in one analysis compared 453 
with SSAFE and EMAlert considers economic (motivation, pressure, opportunity), ease 454 
(capability) and historical drivers. 455 
 456 
4.4 Challenges with FFVA 457 
The challenge with FFVA is that there is a risk of under or over predicting when using 458 
the qualitative criteria developed within the assessment tools. Some tools as outlined use a 459 
matrix approach. A risk matrix is a proven mechanism to semi-quantitatively characterise and 460 
rank risks but the overall risk score obtained by categorising likelihood and severity can be 461 
imprecise and vague (Markowski & Mannan, 2008). This semi-quantitative approach can 462 
produce uncertainties in the risk category determined (Manning, 2013).  Some tools may use 463 
a summative approach to determining risk, others to use multiplier factors when this is 464 
combined with overprediction or underprediction of some risk factors e.g. likelihood this will 465 
lead to a lack of consistency across the tools that can be used. Lack of technical know-how, 466 
failing to access appropriate databases, poor datasets or inappropriate use of databases will 467 
also limit the efficacy of FFVA tools. The emerging nature of food fraud incidents with there 468 
always being the potential for new actors, new agents being used means that the use of FFVA 469 
should not be an annual activity that is static and historic, but needs to be real-time and 470 
reactive if the process is going to provide a meaningful and relevant risk score.  471 
As outlined in this paper there is multiple terminology being used to determine 472 
vulnerability and risk which is a challenge in itself. This emerging terminology from evolving 473 
definitions of authenticity (Sumar & Ismail, 1995) to consideration of types of fraud and the 474 
lack of a harmonized definition of food fraud (Bouzembrak et al. 2018), human behavioral 475 
science, motivation, methods, ethical problems and social and criminal implications (Spink and 476 
Moyer, 2011; Manning & Soon, 2016; Lord, Elizondo, & Spencer, 2017). Specialists from social 477 
science and criminology backgrounds tend to give more emphasis to the social, economic and 478 
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legal aspects of food fraud, while food scientists tend to focus on chemical characteristics of 479 
food, economic gain and t h e  i m p a c t  in terms of public health concerns. More 480 
collaborative work should be done, particularly with social science specialists, to achieve a 481 
universal definition of food fraud.  CODEX proposed an Electronic Working Group (EWG) to 482 
review CODEX gaps and to create a definition and scope for food fraud, food integrity, food 483 
authenticity and other food fraud related terms. This is a major step forward to potentially 484 
incorporate food fraud into the formal Codex Alimentarius which can revamp the food supply 485 
chain as food fraud countermeasures will become a requirement when conducting business 486 
(Spink, 2017).   487 
Undertaking a supply chain FFVA requires the collection of information at the appropriate 488 
steps (points) along the supply chain including raw materials, ingredients, products, 489 
packaging, dispatch; evaluating each step to identify and prioritizing significant vulnerabilities 490 
for food fraud, and then developing appropriate countermeasures such as monitoring and 491 
testing strategies, supplier audits and anti‐counterfeit technologies (GFSI, 2014). Within a 492 
manufacturing business, effective FFVA requires the collection and evaluation of information 493 
on potential food fraud vulnerability associated with the products, processes and people 494 
employed (SSAFE, 2019a).   Spink and Moyer (2011a) argue that FFVA tools are not 495 
holistically applicable to quantify or predict food fraud incidents because an understanding of 496 
criminology and behavioural science is also required. However, FFVA will allow food 497 
businesses to map possible fraud scenarios associated with the materials and products that 498 
the organisation procures, produces and sells, in order to accurately identify the potential 499 
threat, the controls required and the mechanisms for updating such assessments if the 500 
evidence changes in the future. Therefore, vulnerability is specific to the supply base, 501 
ingredients, product, processes and activities undertaken by a given food manufacturer, 502 
processor or retailer. The vulnerability assessment process is dynamic and needs to be 503 
revisited both routinely in line with formal procedures and also reactively in the event that 504 
FFVA outputs are out of date, for example a vulnerability changes or appears because of a 505 
new supplier, harvest failure associated with one particular material or an increase in demand 506 
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for a particular material when supply remains constant. Therefore, FFVA tools identify the 507 
degree of food fraud vulnerability at a given time and in a given set of circumstances.     508 
 509 
5.0 Discussion 510 
Collaborative efforts between private and non-profit sector and governmental bodies 511 
will help to grow food fraud networks to address and tackle food fraud at a landscape level are 512 
hampered by the “pay to use” requirements of many incident databases and FFVA tools. A 513 
lack of consistency in coding within databases and the lack of a universal definition of food 514 
fraud needs to be addressed so it is possible to link, harmonise and connect multiple 515 
databases to share information and intelligence within and between networks. Food fraud 516 
assessment networks are developing. In the EU the FIN network is developing these 517 
collaborative knowledge building as is the work of the JRC (EU Science Hub, 2016).  To date 518 
four EU wide coordinated control plans (horsemeat, fish, honey and online food supplements 519 
and novel foods) had been developed to determine the extent of fraudulent practices in the 520 
food sector (EC, 2018).  These approaches are considering food fraud together with food and 521 
feed safety in a concerted approach but there is no global, universal, central intelligence 522 
database that is available to the food industry, regulators and investigators that brings together 523 
all the intelligence and information that is currently available. This creases an inequity in the 524 
food sector in that many SMEs cannot access such information. However some databases 525 
and tools are free to download and if they have sufficient knowledge and understanding SMEs 526 
can use this tools to start undertaking FFVA. Whilst some FFVA tools aid organisations to 527 
develop a vulnerability profile or vulnerability register for the business, not all go to the next 528 
step of developing a control plan.  As social network analysis research develops with regard 529 
to food fraud especially when combined with crime data mining and criminal network analysis 530 
this will assist further in the development of FFVA tools. Emerging tools that use data mining 531 
will take existing FFVA and detection approaches forward towards more predictive food fraud 532 
modelling.  533 
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Manning and Soon (2014) sought to draw together the elements of both a predictive 534 
and a reactive model for determining food fraud. This model included: determining the 535 
situational and contributing factors for food fraud, identifying the databases that provided 536 
information of interest in order to use FFVA tools and then to identify the factors that influence 537 
the resultant risk ranking. This approach is underpinned by the use of intelligence from 538 
industry, enforcement bodies, media and social network surveillance, economic trends, 539 
unusual factors that could affect supply and demand dynamics and consider their effect. The 540 
detect and react phase of the Manning and Soon (2014) model differentiates between passive 541 
laboratory surveillance as part of routine testing programmes and active laboratory 542 
surveillance which is targeted on known adulterants that is utilised when the risk ranking status 543 
changes. This brings forward an important element of vulnerability assessment that is the use 544 
of passive (static) systems and models or the use of reactive and smart systems that are 545 
constantly evolving as new intelligence comes in. In these tools it can be shown that 546 
vulnerability can be considered as a product, technical or system attribute: in terms of a 547 
weakness or flaw. An internal vulnerability assessment can build understanding of the 548 
weaknesses, criticalities and access points within a specific manufacturing environment where 549 
there are food fraud vulnerabilities.  550 
Other tools, or stages within tool application see vulnerability as a risk i.e. the degree of 551 
exposure (likelihood x severity) reflect on vulnerability in terms of the consequences i.e. the 552 
degree of loss or damages should the incident occur. The other two elements of vulnerability 553 
described in this paper are: the ability or capacity of an organisation or supply chain to return 554 
to a steady state i.e. determining vulnerability  in terms of ability to return to the status quo; 555 
and the need for resilience and for the organisation or supply chain to drive continuous 556 
improvement in the medium to long term. This needs to be addressed in further iterations of 557 
models that drive effective vulnerability reduction action plans. 558 
 559 
6. Conclusion 560 
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   The databases considered here both complement and underpin the various FFVA tools 561 
described, but due to multiple types of food fraud issue, a lack of skills and understanding by 562 
people of how to use FFVA and variable scopes of assessments means that inconsistency in 563 
vulnerability scoring can occur. There is a clear requirement for more industry level 564 
cohesiveness and consistency in how FFVA is undertaken to address both intrinsic and 565 
extrinsic food fraud vulnerability.   566 
FFVA tools differ from conventional purely food safety hazard analysis or risk assessment 567 
tools as FFVA also requires consideration of a number of socio-economic factors. These 568 
include: economic conditions, social and opportunistic issues, knowledge levels of 569 
organization that might make them more vulnerable to fraud, as well as an understanding of 570 
criminal behavior. The impact of fluctuations in market conditions that influence both 571 
perpetrator opportunity, level of economic gain derived and thus the rationalization of whether 572 
to commit fraud, or not are also of importance in assessing vulnerability. The challenge for 573 
policy makers and the industry is therefore to develop FFVA tools so that they can support 574 
assessment of existing vulnerabilities and also overcome knowledge gaps in where and how 575 
fraud might occur. Further, the situational vulnerabilities for a given organization or food supply 576 
chain is of importance to effectively inform the appropriate options for food fraud control and 577 
mitigation at the organization and supply chain level. 578 
  579 
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Table 1. Types of food fraud. (Adapted from Spink & Moyer, 2011a; 2011b; Lotta & 884 
Bogue, 2015; Spink et al., 2016: CWA,17369:2019). 885 
 886 
Types of food fraud 
 
Deception during manufacture 
Overrun (intentional overproduction, sometimes called the “third shift” 
Overtreating (including adding more water than allowed by regulation),  
Diversion into illicit supply chains 
Diversion, 
Smuggling 
Theft 
Duplication 
Simulation,   
Counterfeiting 
Interventions with the food product 
Adulteration  
Addition 
Substitution,  
Product tampering 
Removal 
Unapproved processes  
29 
 
Misrepresentation 
Misdescription 
Record tampering 
Misrepresentation of food characteristics, country of origin, food ingredients or food 
packaging,  
Claim violation   
False or misleading statements made about a product for economic gain  
Underweight product  
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 888 
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Table 2. Types of sampling    889 
 890 
Term Description 
Sampling The process of selecting a subgroup of a population to represent the entire population. 
Sampling strategy A sampling strategy is the approach used to select the units of the target population subject to official controls e.g. 
businesses, foodstuffs, etc 
Routine 
surveillance 
Sampling strategy where samples are taken to check compliance levels and detect previously unidentified issues. 
Routine surveillance may be risk-based, with samples selected to match some form of risk rating. Surveillance may be 
planned and funded at a national level, such as through EU competent authorities through national sampling 
programmes, or locally determined.  Local sampling plans may be informed by national priorities as well as local 
assessment of risks. 
 
Types of sampling 
 
Availability 
sampling 
See convenience sampling 
Census sampling Sampling strategy that samples the totality of the population on which the data is reported. 
Convenience or 
convenient 
sampling 
A non-probability sampling strategy that uses the most easily accessible people (or cases) to participate in a study. Also 
know as opportunity sampling and availability sampling or strategy based on the selection of a sample for which units are 
selected only on the basis of feasibility or ease of data collection. It's a not random sampling. The data reported refer 
themselves to units selected according to this strategy. 
Judgmental 
sampling 
See suspect sampling 
Objective 
sampling 
Selection of a random sample from a population on which the data are reported. 
Opportunity 
sampling 
See convenience sampling  
Probability 
sampling 
The probability sampling method gives each eligible element/unit a known (and commonly equal) chance of being 
selected in the sample; random procedures are employed to select a sample using a sampling frame. Also known as 
random sampling 
Purposive 
sampling 
A non-probability sampling strategy in which the researcher selects participants who are considered to be typical of the 
wider population (sometimes referred to as judgmental sampling) 
31 
 
Quota sampling A non-probability sampling strategy where the researcher identifies the various strata of a population and ensures that all 
these strata are proportionately represented within the sample to increase its representativeness 
Random 
sampling 
See probability sampling 
Selective 
sampling 
Sampling strategy is based on the selection of a random sample from a subpopulation (or more frequently from 
subpopulations) of a population on which the data are reported. The subpopulations are can but are not always 
determined on a risk basis. The sampling from each subpopulation is not proportional: the sample size is proportionally 
bigger for instance in subpopulations considered at high risk. This sampling includes also the case when the data 
reported refer to censuses on subpopulations 
Snowball 
sampling 
A non-probability sampling strategy whereby referrals from earlier participants are used to gather the required number of 
participants 
Statutory 
sampling 
Official sampling undertaken where the products to be tested as well as frequency of the said testing is set out in law to 
control specific health risks. 
Stratified 
sampling 
Probability based sampling where the population is divided into specific groups (strata) and a sample is drawn from each 
group. 
Suspect sampling Suspect sampling or enforcement related sampling is a form of judgmental sampling where the selection of an individual 
product or establishment is done in order to confirm or reject a suspicion of non-conformity. Sampling strategy where 
samples are taken as part of enforcement investigations.  
 891 
Sources: (Huddersfield University, nd; Eurostat, 2010; Wright, Ibrahim, Manning & McKellar, 2014) 892 
 893 
 894 
Table 3. Comparison of databases that provide information that can be used in a food fraud vulnerability assessment. 895 
 896 
Name Accessibility Openn
ess 
Maturit
y Level 
Purpose Functionality Source of data Downloadin
g of data 
FFVA Capacity 
RASFF 
System 
Free to access Leader
s 
Competen
t authority 
informatio
n 
Searchable with 
classifications 
Purposive, 
random or 
reactive, 
sampling from 
Free to 
download 
Database only no 
additional 
vulnerability 
assessment tool. 
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exchange 
forum  
regulatory 
sampling 
 
Food 
Fraud 
Risk 
Informatio
n 
Database 
Free to access 
top level data – 
pay to view 
database 
Followe
rs 
Informatio
n 
exchange 
forum 
Categorised into lists by 
product type or time period. 
Ability to subscribe to a list 
or an individual card 
On-line news 
items and alerts 
Data lists are 
accessible 
but pay to 
download a 
historic 
database on 
a 
spreadsheet 
Database with a risk 
rating (high, 
medium, low) risk 
assessment criteria 
not shown. No 
additional 
vulnerability 
assessment tool. 
Decernis 
Food 
Fraud 
Database 
Pay to access 
Annual 
subscription or 
30 day 
subscription 
Beginn
ers 
Database 
to enable 
FFVA 
Categorised by ingredients 
with search capabilities and 
analytics 
Scientific 
articles, media, 
regulatory and 
judicial reports 
and food 
industry and 
trade 
associations 
No free data Database and 
associated FFVA 
capability within the 
tool. 
Food 
Adulteratio
n Incident 
Registry 
(FAIR). 
Pay to access 
annual 
subscription 
Information over 
five years old is 
free 
Followe
rs 
Incident 
database 
Categorised by incident  Publically 
available data 
Data over 
five years old 
is freely 
accessible 
Database and 
associated with 
FOODSHIELD a 
collaborative 
platform and the 
Intentional 
Adulteration 
Assessment Tool 
(IAAT) for food 
defence 
Food 
Integrity 
Network 
(FIN) 
Subscription 
based on 
personal 
credentials – 
Stakeholder or 
expert 
Horizonscan is 
Beginn
ers 
Incident 
database 
Categorised by incident  Suspected and 
actual incidents 
of adulteration 
No free data Database and 
knowledge network 
– linked to Horizon 
Scan. No FFVA 
capability. 
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a subscription 
only service 
MedISys-
FF 
Open access Leader
s 
European 
Commissi
on 
database 
Categorised by type of 
disease, food safety hazard 
or threat 
Publically 
available media 
information 
Freely 
available 
Database. No FFVA 
capability. 
The US 
FDA 
Recalls, 
Market 
Withdrawa
ls and 
Safety 
Alerts 
Database 
 
Open access Leader
s 
Regulator
s 
database 
of issued 
alerts 
Categorised by recall type 
by commodity e.g. food, 
cosmetics etc. 
Regulatory data. 
Publically 
available 
database 
Freely 
available 
Database of alerts 
that is searchable. 
Older data is 
archived but 
available. No FFVA 
capability. 
UKFSS 
Database 
Private 
database 
None Incident 
and 
sampling 
database 
Private system Regulatory 
sampling 
No freely 
available 
data 
Database. No FFVA 
capability. 
Private 
laboratory 
databases 
Private 
databases 
None Sampling 
databases 
Private system Market sampling 
systems 
No freely 
available 
data  
Database. No FFVA 
capability. 
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 898 
Table 4. Comparison of the two FFVA tools provided by Food Fraud Advisors (2018) 899 
Vulnerability Assessment Tool v3.0s 
 
Vulnerability Assessment Tool (BRC method) 
Suitable for ingredients, raw materials such as processing aids, additives, 
packaging materials, finished products, dietary supplements, herbal 
remedies (oral), functional food additives and ‘boosters’ 
Suitable for food ingredients 
Addresses all aspects of food fraud Addresses economically motivated adulteration, substitution 
and dilution 
34 
 
Based on the methodology recommended by Michigan State University 
Food Fraud Initiative 
Based on the method recommended by the British Retail 
Consortium (BRC) 
Generates a report containing: 
Purpose and scope 
Likelihood of food fraud and impact (severity) of food fraud 
The results of the vulnerability assessment in a risk matrix format 
Optional initial screening (pre-filter) step  
Optional controls report 
Generates a report containing: 
Purpose and scope 
Likelihood of occurrence of food fraud for the material 
Likelihood of detection of food fraud 
The results of the vulnerability assessment in a risk matrix 
format 
 
Suitable to meet the requirements of all major food safety standards and 
can be used by food businesses that do not operate a formal food safety 
management system 
Designed to meet the requirements of BRC Food Safety 
Issue 8. 
Easy to review and update 
Results and data can easily be copied and pasted into other documents 
Save, file and print the results for your next audit 
900 
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